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Lisa J. Ferlazzo & Linda Omdorff
A Note on the Format
The Best Respondent's Brief is a reproduction of the brief that
was originally submitted for the Froessel Competition. Although the
brief is printed in its entirety, minor formatting changes have been
required for publication purposes.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, should this Court find that
FMS § 186.5 comports with the Equal Protection Clause, given
that Petitioners are not discriminated against based on their sex
or sexual orientation, and if so, does Froessel's legitimate public
policy interests, advanced by the marriage statute, satisfy
rational basis scrutiny?
II. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, should this Court find that
Froessel's statutes prohibiting physician assisted suicide
comport with the Due Process Clause, given that no fundamental
liberty interest exists in this nation's history and tradition, and
if so, does Froessel's substantial public policy interests outweigh
Petitioners' asserted interest?
820 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ........................................
Table of Contents ..........................................
Table of A uthorities ........................................
O pinions Below ...........................................
Counter-Statement of the Case ...............................
Summary of Argument ..... ...... .....................
A rgum ent ........................... .....................
I. FROESSEL'S MARRIAGE STATUTE COMPORTS WITH
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE GIVEN THAT THE
STATE'S INTERESTS IN PREVENTING STDs AND
PROMOTING PROCREATION CAN ONLY BE ADVANCED
BY THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE,
WHICH INEVITABLY EXCLUDES SAME SEX
CO U PLES .........................................
A. FMS § 186.5 Provides Equivalent Rights To Marry To
Both Males And Females; Therefore, It Does Not
Discriminate Based On Sex .....................
1. The right to marry can only be afforded to
opposite-sex couples since the traditional
definition of this institution requires the
exclusion of male and female pairs equally ...
1997] BEST RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 821
2. Marriage is a fundamental right afforded to
individuals of both sexes, which must be
forfeited when they choose a partner of the
same-sex.........................
3. The right to marry does not offend equal
protection because Petitioners are not
homosexuals and Froessel's statute would
similarly deny them a license if they were
m ales .................................
B. Petitioners Are Not A Suspect Class Requiring
Heightened Scrutiny, And Froessel's Legitimate
Interests Are Advanced By FMS §186.5; Therefore,
Rational Basis Is Satisfied ......................
1. The proper standard of review is the rational
basis test since Petitioners are not discriminated
against based on their sex .................
2. STDs. which threaten the health of society, are
enough of a concern to require a statute that can
aid in prevention ........................
3. Procreation is essential to the continuance of the
population and should be promoted by the
state ..................................
822 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
II. FROESSEL'S STATUTES PROHIBITING ASSISTED
SUICIDE COMPORT WITH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
BECAUSE EVEN IF A LIBERTY INTEREST EXISTS IN
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE, THE STATE'S
INTERESTS IN PRESERVING LIFE, PREVENTING
SUICIDE, AND AVOIDING THE INFLUENCE OF THIRD
PARTIES OUTWEIGH THAT ASSERTED INTEREST ....
A. Physician Assisted Suicide Is Not A Fundamental Right
Protected By The Due Process Clause .............
B. Even If A Liberty Interest Is Found To Exist In
Physician Assisted Suicide, Froessel's Interest In
Preserving Life, Preventing Suicide, And Avoiding The
Influence Of Third Parties Outweighs That Liberty
Interest .....................................
I. Froessel's interest in preserving life outweighs
Ms. McGregor's interest in assisted suicide ...
2. Froessel's interest in preventing suicide
outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest in receiving
assisted suicide .........................
3. Froessel's interest in avoiding the influence of
third parties outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest
in assisted suicide .......................
C onclusion ...............................................
1997] BEST RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 823
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES:
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
Cruzan v. Director. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976)
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
Romer v. Evans, _ U.S. _; 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS CASES:
Adams v. Sullivan, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982)
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996)
STATE COURT CASES:
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971)
824 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. [Vol. XIII
Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973)
Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994)
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974)
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES:
U.S. Const. art. 31 §1
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1992)
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (5th Unabridged Lawyers' Ed.)
BEST RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
OPINIONS BELOW
The United States District Court, District of Froessel, granted
Petitioners' motion for declaratory and injunctive relief to obtain a
marriage license and allow physician assisted suicide. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court and denied Respondents' declaratory and injunctive relief
on both causes of action.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1993, the Petitioners, Willamina Wallace and Murron
McGregor, a same-sex couple, decided that they wanted their
relationship to become a legally recognized marriage. (R. at 2). They
contend that the legal recognition of their relationship will entitle them
to benefits that they would ordinarily be denied, such as naming each
other the beneficiary of each other's life insurance policies. (R. at 2).
Soon after they applied for a marriage license, their application was
denied by the Froessel Department of Health. (R. at 3). Specifically, in
accordance with historical definitions and nearly every other state and
the Federal Government, Froessel's Marriage Statute ("FMS § 186.5")
provides that: "A marriage is valid only if it is solemnized and
registered, between an unmarried male and an unmarried female, both
whom are at least 18 years of age and not otherwise disqualified." (R.
at 6).
On October 5, 1994, Ms. McGregor was diagnosed with cancer.
(R. at 3). Soon after, Ms. McGregor and Dr. Wallace contacted Dr.
Robert Bruce, a leading cancer specialist, who informed them that a cure
would be available in one and a half years. (R. at 4). With only six
months left until a possible cure, Ms. McGregor asked Dr. Wallace to
assist her in killing herself. (R. at 5).
Prior to being diagnosed with cancer, Ms. McGregor signed a
living will entitling her to removal from being kept alive by artificial
means. (R. at 5). While Froessel has a living will statute, it prohibits
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physician assisted suicide. (R. at 5). Accordingly, forty-two states
permit the refusal of unwanted medical treatment, while thirty-two states
make assisted suicide a crime. (R. at 5). Moreover, the Limke Study by
the Froessel Department of Health and Hospital services found that
suicide is the second leading cause of death in young people ages
thirteen through thirty-four, and one of the top five causes of death for
the thirty-five through fifty-four age group. (R. at 23). Additionally,
the Limke study found that fifty-one percent of all suicides are not
committed by people suffering from terminal illness but by those
suffering treatable mental disorders. (R. at 23).
Ms. McGregor and Dr. Wallace filed suit in the District Court of
the State of Froessel to challenge the constitutionality of Froessel's
prohibition of same sex marriage and the statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide. (R. at 16). The district court granted declarative and injunctive
relief in favor of Petitioners on both issues. (R. at 16). However, the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
lower court on both counts. (R. at 16-17).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Thirteenth Circuit denying Petitioner's motions for declaratory
and injunctive relief. Froessel's Marriage Statute ("FMS §186.5")
comports with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, a state has a compelling interest in
protecting the health and well-being of its citizens by preventing
sexually transmitted diseases and promoting procreation. Froessel
advanced these legitimate interests by passing the marriage statute
which promotes monogamy and stability, therefore satisfying rational
basis scrutiny. Since the statute encompasses the traditional definition
of marriage and provides equal rights to marry for both males and
females, it does not discriminate based on sex and, thus, should be
upheld as constitutional in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause.
Additionally, Froessel's statutes prohibiting assisted suicide
826 [Vol. XIII
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conform with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, physician assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
because it is not rooted in this nation's history and tradition. Even if a
liberty interest was found to exist, the state's compelling interests in
preserving life, preventing suicide, and avoiding the influence of third
parties outweigh the asserted liberty interest. Therefore, this Court
should uphold the finding of the lower court denying declaratory and
injunctive relief to Petitioners.
ARGUMENT
I. FROESSEL'S MARRIAGE STATUTE COMPORTS
WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT GIVEN THAT THE
STATE'S INTERESTS IN PREVENTING STDs AND
PROMOTING PROCREATION CAN ONLY BE
ADVANCED BY THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION
OF MARRIAGE, WHICH INEVITABLY EXCLUDES
SAME-SEX COUPLES.
This Court should uphold the United States Court of Appeals
decision, which denied Petitioners declaratory and injunctive relief to a
marriage license under the Froessel Marriage Statute ("FMS"). The
reversal of the district court is warranted because FMS §186.5 is
constitutional as applied to same-sex marriages. The limitation of
.marriage in FMS § 186.5 to opposite-sex couples is not discriminatory
because it defines the institution without denying rights of one gender
over the other. Therefore, it does not offend equal protection rights.
Additionally, any statute may be struck down if it is inherently
discriminatory in purpose. However, "a statute which distinguishes
between certain classes of persons is generally presumed to be
constitutional and will be upheld if it rests upon some reasonable and
rational basis; only classifications which are 'inherently suspect' must
meet the test of a compelling state interest." Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
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1187, 1195 (Wash. 1974). Froessel's interests in preventing the spread
of sexually-transmitted diseases and promoting procreation are
legitimate public policy concerns for the general welfare. Since only the
traditional institution of marriage incorporates these interests, Froessel
has shown that its statute is reasonably related to advancing these goals.
Therefore, since the Froessel Marriage Statute does not discriminate
based on sex, but rather protects the fundamental right to marriage for
both sexes equivalently, and the state provides a rational basis for
denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, the statute should be
upheld.
A. FMS § 186.5 Provides Equivalent Rights
To Marry To Both Males And Females;
Therefore, It Does Not Discriminate
Based On Sex.
The Froessel statute defines "marriage" as valid within the
context of a union between one male and one female. FMS § 186.39 (4).
Under the statute, both genders are equally permitted to marry the other.
Thus, a female and a male have equivalent rights to marry. "Sex" is
defined as "the sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of being male
or female." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990). Since the
marriage statute does not distinguish between the rights of either gender,
it cannot distinguish based on sex. The district court asserted that "if Dr.
Wallace were a man, Froessel would allow her to marry Ms. McGregor."
(R. at 6.) However, the court in Singgr held that Petitioners must show
that they are somehow being treated differently by the government than
they would be if they were males. 522 P.2d at 1191. Therefore,
Petitioners' argument fails because if Ms. McGregor were also a man,
they would similarly be denied a license to marry. This exemplifiesthat
the statute does not provide rights to one sex that it denies the other.
Therefore, Petitioners are not excluded on account of their sex.
828 [Vol. XlII
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1. The right to marry can only be afforded
to opposite-sex couples since the
traditional definition of this institution
requires the exclusion of male and
female pairs equally.
Under the Equal Rights Amendment, individuals are protected
from denial of existing rights solely because of their sex. U.S. Const.
art. 3 1, § 1. However, the Constitution does not provide for the creation
of new rights for Petitioners simply because they are females. Although
Petitioners claim that "sex" may include "sexual orientation," "laws
which differentiate between the sexes are not invalid when they are
based upon unique characteristics of one sex rather than upon
membership in such sex per se." Sing, 522 P.2d at 1194. Therefore,
since FMS § 186.5 concerns the unique characteristics of both sexes in
the union of marriage, it cannot discriminate based on sex.
2. Marriage is a fundamental right afforded
to individuals of both sexes, which must
be forfeited when they choose a partner
of the same sex.
Froessel's limitation of marriage to a man and a woman does not
violate any individual rights. The fundamental right to marry exists only
between members of the opposite sex. This is evidenced by prior courts
which have considered the question and all concluded that same-sex
relationships are outside of the proper definition of marriage. Similarly,
"the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the
issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a
marriage." Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973).
However, Petitioners claim they should be granted a marriage license
because the Constitution protects individuals from infringement of
fundamental rights. Consequently, Froessel is denying neither Dr.
Wallace nor Ms. McGregor from obtaining a marriage license. Rather
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the license is conditional to having a partner of the opposite sex in
accord with the customary definition of marriage.
The notion of marriage as a fundamental right is paramount
throughout the history of civilization and incorporated in the traditional
values that have shaped our society. "Marriage was a custom long
before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose. It has
always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have
been presented with no evidence to the contrary." Id. at 589.
Additionally, Congress's recent amendment to the definition of marriage
distinctly specifies, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife." Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). Therefore, as in
Adams, where the common meaning of "spouse" was evaluated for
immigration purposes, it would similarly be inappropriateto expand the
meaning of the terms as Congress has plainly defined them for purposes
of granting Petitionersa marriage license. Adams v. Sullivan, 673 F.2d
1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982).
Petitioners question the application of the statute because it
invariably excludes same-sex couples from marriage. However, it is
significant to look to the intent of the statute to determine if it
discriminates. "The fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Where statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, it must be construed to its plain and
obvious meaning." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 47 (Haw. 1993).
Thus, in determining the proper intention of the statute, this Court
should adhere to the explicit definition as amended by Congress. In
examining the importance of the traditional concept of marriage, it has
been held, "this historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded
than the asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal
interests.., the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring
it by judicial legislation." Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186
(Minn. 1971). The right to marry, therefore, is fundamental to
individuals of both sexes, yet, evidently it is qualified in that it can only
be granted to individuals of both sexes together. Although Petitioner
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may argue that the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition against
same-sex marriages, a legislative intent to authorize such marriages is
not implicated, nor can it be assumed. Id. at 185.
3. The right to marry does not offend
Equal Protection because Petitioners are
not homosexuals and Froessel's statute
would similarly deny them a license if
they were males.
Petitioners are not being denied a fundamental right to equal
protection of the laws. According to the plain meaning of "marriage"
and "sex" provided by numerous courts, it would be inconceivable for
any marriage statute to discriminate based on sex. Although the term
"sex" could possibly be interpreted to include "sexual orientation," Dr.
Wallace and Ms. McGregor told the clerk that they were not "a
homosexual couple." (R. at 3.). Since Petitioners are not part of a sex-
based classification, they are not, as the district court claims, analogous
to the interracial couple in Loving. (R. at 3.) (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1,7 (1967)). The intent of that statute was to classify based on
race, while Froessel's statute does not intend sex classification.
Whereas in Loving, the couple was clearly interracial, Petitioners' sexual
orientation is questionable, and they do not belong to a suspect class
which would require heightened scrutiny. Therefore, the equal
application of FMS §186.5 to Petitioners does not constitute a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause since Froessel is not discriminating
against Petitioners based on their sex or sexual orientation.
Furthermore, as the court of appeals held, even when a marriage
statute was found to discriminate based on sex, the court did not permit
same-sex marriages. A failure to recognize the right to same-sex
marriages is not violative of the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice, which are the basis of our civil and political institutions.
"Neither is the right to same-sex marriage implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty norjustice would exist if it were
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sacrificed." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 47. Another court has held that there is
"no constitutional sanction or protection of the marriage between
persons of the same sex." Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. Conversely,
petitioners in similar circumstances have argued, "the absence of an
express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages evinces a
legislative intent to authorize such marriages." Baker, 191 N.W.2d at
185. However, yet another decision on this issue held that there is no
United States Supreme Court decision that supports "the assertion that
the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a
fundamental right of all persons and that restricting marriage to only
couples of the opposite sex is irrational and invidiously discriminatory."
Id. at 186.
Although Froessel restricts marriage to opposite-sex couples, it
cannot be inferred that it is discriminating against homosexuals.
Froessel may use its police power to pass laws for the general welfare of
its citizens so long as it does not interfere with Constitutional rights. (R.
at 18.). Since there are legitimate state concerns supportingthe marriage
statute and it does not discriminate based on sex, FMS § 186.5 comports
with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
B. Petitioners Are Not A Suspect Class
Requiring Heightened Scrutiny, And
Froessel's Legitimate Interests Are
Advanced By FMS §186.5; Therefore,
Rational Basis Is Satisfied.
The proper standard of review is the rational basis test because
Petitioners are not a suspect class requiring strictjudicial scrutiny. They
claim that they are not homosexuals, but rather, a same-sex couple.
Therefore, since Froessel's Marriage Statute does not classify based on
gender, strict scrutiny is unwarranted. Rather, as the court of appeals
has explicated, the classification in question can be reconciled if
Froessel's legitimate interests outweigh the disadvantages imposed on
Petitioners. Romer v. Evans, _ U.S. _ ; 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628
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(1996). Therefore, as this Court has held, when there is an equal
protection challenge, the standard of review remains, "the legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
1. The proper standard of review is the
rational basis test since Petitioners are
not discriminated based on their sex.
Froessel has proven that, although the statute unavoidably
excludes same-sex relationships, it is constitutional because it satisfies
the rational basis scrutiny. The legitimate interests the state advances
include 1) preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
("STDs") and 2) promoting procreation. (R. at 22.). This Court must
weigh these interests against the interests of Petitioners to "enjoy the
benefits of marriage, including naming each other as the beneficiariesof
each other's estate and life insurance policies." (R. at 2.). Ms.
McGregor is still able to name Dr. Wallace as the beneficiary of her
estate by providing for it in her will. Furthermore, if this Court finds in
favor of Froessel on the liberty interest issue, Dr. Wallace will not be
able to inherit life insurance after Ms. McGregor's death because the
policy itself, not the state, mandates that "no benefits will be paid to a
beneficiarywho was involved in the suicide if a valid state law prohibits
assisted suicide at the time of the suicide." (R. at 3.).
Although Petitioners may claim that their interests in marrying
cannot be rectified by the state, as in Cleburne, "if that were a criterion
for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social
legislation would now be suspect." 473 U.S. at 445. Finally, applying
heightened scrutiny "is also purportedly inappropriate when many
legislative classifications affecting the group are likely to be valid." Id.
at 468.
In determining the standard of review, this Court has held that
we must, "look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on
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a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the
specifics of the case before us." Id. Thus, even if Petitioners' claim that
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry has merit, valid state
objectives that promote the public good have greater significance.
Froessel's interest in preventing STDs and promoting procreation are
rationally related to a statute which protects the sanctity of marriage.
Overall, a statute which distinguishes between certain classes of persons
is presumed to be constitutional. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195.
2. STDs. which threaten the health of
society, are enough of a concern to
require a statute that can aid in
prevention.
Since Froessel's interests are to protect the health and well being
of the citizens of Froessel, preventing STDs is a legitimate concern. As
the statistics show, sixty-one percent of homosexuals in Froessel are
affected with STDs, while the national average in 1994 was fifty-three
percent. (R. at 9.). Although the total percentage of those affected is
three percent, the majority of the cases occur in the homosexual
population. Thus, since the risk of spreading disease is significantly
greater among this group, Froessel has a legitimate concern in reducing
the number of people at risk. Since marriage promotes stability and
monogamy, the statute promotes health. Froessel has the power to enact
a statute to promote a legitimate end concerning the health of its
citizens. Furthermore, this Court has held that, "when social or
economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
States wide latitude." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432. Therefore, Froessel
has a valid interest in the prevention of STDs.
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3. Procreation is essential to the
continuance of the population and
should be promoted by the state.
Froessel's interest in promoting procreation is a valid objective
to preserving the continuance of the population. The institution of
marriage as "a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book
of Genesis." Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186. Accordingly, the traditional
definition of marriage and procreation is fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race. Id. If FMS § 186.5 is interpreted to
include same-sex marriages, the customary meaning of the institution is
eradicated and many problems could potentially ensue, for example, the
legal ramifications of adopting children into such a "family." Singe,
522 P.2d at 1191. In addition, the legislative purpose behind FMS
§186.5, which authorizes marriage only between two persons of
different sex, is to give effect to the public policy of marriage being an
appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and rearing of children.
The prohibition of same-sex marriages results from the impossibility of
procreation. Id. at 1195.
Procreation is only possible with opposite-sex couples.
Therefore, since same-sex couples undoubtedly cannot advance this
goal, their exclusion is acceptable. Accordingly, Froessel is only
required to establish a reasonable relation between procreation and FMS
§ 186.5. Thus, the exclusion of same-sex marriages; "results from such
impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious
discrimination on account of sex." Id.
Petitioners have the opportunity to lobby to the legislature to
change the definition of marriage as stated in FMS § 186.5. However,
the role of this Court is to determine the constitutionality of the statute.
For Constitutional purposes, it is enough to recognize
that marriage as now defined is deeply rooted in our
society. Although married persons are not required to
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have children or even to engage in sexual relations,
marriage is so clearly related to the public interest in
affording a favorable environment for the growth of
children that we are unable to say that there is not a
rational basis upon which the state may limit the
protection of its marriage laws to the legal union of one
man and one woman.
Id. at 1197.
For the foregoing reasons, Froessel has shown that there is a
legitimate concern to prevent STDs and promote procreation. Since
FMS § 186.5 is reasonably related to satisfying that goal, it comports
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals should be upheld and
Petitioners motion should be denied.
II. FROESSEL' S STATUTES PROHIBITINGASSISTED
SUICIDE COMPORT WITH THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE BECAUSE EVEN IF A LIBERTY
INTEREST EXISTS IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTED
SUICIDE, THE STATE'S INTERESTS IN
PRESERVING LIFE, PREVENTING SUICIDE, AND
AVOIDING THE INFLUENCE OF THIRD PARTIES
OUTWEIGH THAT ASSERTED INTEREST.
This Court should affirm the Thirteenth Circuit's decision
holding Froessel's statutes prohibiting physician assisted suicide
constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is a Due Process violation when an individual's
liberty interest outweighs the asserted state interests Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). Petitioners do not have a liberty
interest in assisted suicide. However, even if this Court finds a liberty
interest in assisted suicide, it does not outweigh Froessel's asserted
interests. Therefore, Froessel's statutes prohibiting assisted suicide do
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not violate the Due Process Clause.
A. Physician Assisted Suicide Is Not A
Fundamental Right Protected By The
Due Process Clause
There is no liberty interest in physician assisted suicide. Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996). To determine if a liberty
interest exists, courts look to whether the interest is deeply rooted in this
nation's history and tradition or whether that interest is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1976); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Accordingly, this Court is hesitant to expand the fundamental rights of
the Due Process Clause when no historical or traditional support exists.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). Thus, the historical
approach is the most appropriate method to utilize. In contrast,
Petitioners will argue that the best test is whether the right is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty. However, this Court held, "the Court is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution." Id. Hence, it follows that the
most accurate way to determine if a liberty interest exists is through an
examination of history, not through the concept of ordered liberty.
Physician assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in this nation's
history or traditions. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724. Accordingly, at common
law, suicide was a criminal offense, with stigmatizing consequences. Id.
(citing Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide a Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq.
L. Rev. 1, 56-67 (1985)). Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court
held, "it would be an impermissibly radical departure from existing
tradition, and from the principles that underlie that tradition, to declare
that there is such a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause." Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 733 (1994). Thus,
due to a lack of historical and traditional foundation, Dr. Wallace is not
constitutionallyprotected to assist Ms. McGregor in committing suicide.
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Additionally, although Froessel recognizes a right to the refusal
of unwanted medical treatment, this right does not equate with a liberty
interest in physician assisted suicide. Accordingly, in Cruzan, this Court
found that a liberty interest exists in the refusal of unwanted medical
treatment but did not extend the decision to other cases concerning
medical treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo, Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 277-78 (1990). Furthermore, refusing unwanted medical treatment
permits life to run its natural course, while suicide is an affirmative step
taken to end a life. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 728. Alternatively,
Petitioners will argue that there is no distinction between refusing
medical treatment and physician assisted suicide. However, more than
forty states have adopted living will statutes permitting the refusal of
medical treatment, whereas thirty-two states still make physician
assisted suicide a crime. (R. at 5.). Thus, Ms. McGregor is free to
refuse life sustaining treatment because she has signed a living will, but
Dr. Wallace cannot legally end Ms. McGregor's life.
Additionally, federal courts should not interfere with a state's
power to prevent suicide. Specifically, "American law has always
accorded the state the power to prevent suicide, by force if necessary."
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J. concurring). Thus, Froessel's citizens
can decide whether assisted suicide should be prohibited through the
election of public officials. Therefore, no liberty interest exists in
assisted suicide.
B. Even If A Liberty Interest Is Found To
Exist In Physician Assisted Suicide,
Froessel's Interest In Preserving Life,
Preventing Suicide, And Avoiding The
Influence Of Third Parties Outweighs
That Liberty Interest.
This Court should find that because no liberty interest in
physician assisted suicide exists, the examination ends here. It is only
after a liberty interest is identified, that a court must balance that liberty
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interest against state interests. Youngber 457 U.S. at 320. Even if this
Court finds a liberty interest in physician assisted suicide, the state's
interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, and avoiding the
influence of third parties outweigh that liberty interest.
1. Froessel's interest in preserving life
outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest in
assisted suicide.
Froessel's interest in preserving life outweighs Ms. McGregor's
interest in assisted suicide. Accordingly, states have an interest in
preserving the lives of citizens so they can contribute to society.
Alternatively, Petitioners will contend that a state's interest in preserving
life should depend on the circumstances. However, in Cruzan, this court
found, "a state may properly decline to make judgements about the
quality of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 282. Thus, Froessel's statutes exhibit an unqualified interest in
preserving life, and Ms. McGregor's desire to assisted suicide is
outweighed by that interest.
State statutes permitting the refusal of unwanted medical
treatment do not reduce Froessel's interest in preserving life. Moreover,
refusing unwanted medical treatment allows life to run its natural course,
while suicide artificially ends life. Accordingly, medical advancements
have made it possible to cure life threatening diseases. Likewise, Dr.
Bruce indicated that treatment for Ms. McGregor's illness will soon be
available. (R. at 4.). To the contrary, Petitioners will claim that the
Ninth Circuit appropriately found that a living will is evidence of a
state's lack of interest in preserving life. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 818-19 (1996). However, competent people
refusing to prolong their lives are significantly different from people
assisting others to kill themselves. Thus, because of differences between
assisted suicide and refusing medical treatment, and because a cure is
forthcoming, the state's interest in preserving life outweighs Ms.
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McGregor's interest in dying.
2. Froessel's interest in preventing suicide
outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest in
receiving assisted suicide.
Froessel's interest in preventing suicide outweighs Ms.
McGregor's interest in assisted suicide. The Limke Study by the
Froessel Department of Health and Hospital Services found that suicide
is the second leading cause of death in young people ages fifteen
through thirty-four, and one of the top five causes of death for the thirty-
five through fifty-four age group. (R. at 23.). Hence, suicide is a
disturbing problem in the State of Froessel. Moreover, the Limke study
found that fifty-one percent of all suicides are not committed by people
suffering from terminal illness but by those suffering treatable mental
disorders. (R. at 23.). Therefore, the state should prevent suicide and
not permit citizens to kill themselves through physician assisted suicide.
Additionally, doctor involvement in assisted suicide has been
regarded as contrary to the Hippocratic Oath. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d
at 731 n.50. Specifically, a doctor is not supposed to give advice or
deadly drugs in order to cause death. Id. (citing STEADMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 650 (5th Unabridged Lawyers' Ed.)). Therefore, Dr.
Wallace has an ethical responsibility as a doctor not to assist Ms.
McGregor in committing suicide. Also, a state has an interest in doctors
attempting to cure illness and ease pain, not in assisted suicide.
Consequently, statutes preventing assisted suicide help to prevent
unnecessary deaths. Thus, even if assisted suicide were a liberty
interest, Froessel's concern in preserving life outweighs that interest.
3. Froessel's interest in avoiding the
influence of third parties outweighs Ms.
McGregor's interest in assisted suicide.
Froessel's interest in avoiding the influence of third parties
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outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest in assisted suicide. Accordingly,the
Ninth Circuit held, "a state may properly assert an interest in prohibiting
even altruistic assistance to a person contemplating suicide."
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825. Furthermore, allowing assisted
suicide may increase the frequency of suicide and have a negative affect
on the person who assists in the suicide. Id. Hence, the state's interest
in avoiding the influence of third parties outweighs a person's interest
in receiving assistance to commit suicide.
A state has an interest to ensure that people are not influenced
to kill themselves by third parties. Accordingly, the Donaldson court
held, "the state's interest must prevail over the individual because of the
difficulty, if not the impossibility of evaluating the motives of the
assister or determiningthe presence of undue influence." Donaldson v.
Lungren. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Thus, people may
be pressured into taking their own lives. Specifically, people may take
their lives to prevent loved ones from economic despair, or other
considerations. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826. Alternatively,
Petitioners will argue that the state could regulate to "minimize the risk
of abuse."(R. at 15.). However, if there is a risk that any citizen will die
needlessly, the state needs to prevent that possibility. Therefore, the
State's interest in preventing outside influences from taking citizens
lives outweighs Ms. McGregor's interest in physician assisted suicide.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision
of the court of appeals and deny declaratory and injunctive relief to
Petitioners.
Respectfully submitted,
Lisa J Ferlazzo & Linda Orndorff
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